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以金融制裁为切入点，选用1995—2022年全球129个国家的金融制裁与宏观经济数据，系统考察了其对目标国劳动力市场的冲击路径与影响效应。研究发现，金融制裁会导致就业水平异常波动，减少目标国劳动力市场的就业人口，提高被制裁国失业率。从就业结构来看，金融制裁导致目标国工业部门和服务业部门的就业水平下降，农业部门的就业水平反而增加，非正规就业规模显著扩大。机制分析表明，金融制裁通过抑制对外贸易、诱发政治社会动荡以及加剧汇率波动等渠道，间接影响目标国劳动力市场。基于以上结论，目标国应根据制裁强度实施差异化制度，构建技术自主的金融基础设施，深度嵌入区域价值链，增强制裁抵御能力。
Abstract：This study systematically examined the pathway of the impacts and implications of financial sanctions on the labor markets of sanctioned countries.It used macroeconomic data from 129 sanctioned countries from 1995 to 2022.The findings showed that financial sanctions caused a significant reduction in the workforce and a rise in the unemployment rate, leading to abnormal fluctuations in the employment rate in those countries' labor markets.Regarding employment structure, financial sanctions triggered a decline in manufacturing and service sector employment, while driving labor toward the agricultural sector and expanding informal employment.The mechanism-based analysis indicated that financial sanctions indirectly impacted the labor market by suppressing international trade, creating political and social instability, and exacerbating exchange rate volatility, among other factors.Consequently, to enhance their resilience against sanctions, sanctioned countries should tailor their systems based on sanction intensity and develop technologically independent financial infrastructures that are deeply integrated into their regional value chains.
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(1)用脚投票指个体或企业通过自主选择迁移、退出或加入某个区域、组织或市场,来间接表达对当地政策、公共服务、制度环境或市场条件的偏好与评价。在本文的语境下,“用脚投票”指的是全球产业链中的关联企业主动选择与目标国“脱钩”,即通过撤离或终止合作来表达对制裁环境下经营风险的规避。
(2)本文所使用的政治稳定性指数数据来源于WGI的详细文档,底层源数据的完全访问可以在govindicators.org上获得完全访问。
(3)受限于篇幅,省略相关结果,留存备索。
(4)恐怖主义指数衡量了人们对恐怖主义可能性的看法,百分位排名是指该国在综合指标涵盖的所有国家中的排名,0代表最低排名,100代表最高排名,数据来源于WGI的详细文档,底层源数据的完全访问可以在govindicators.org上获得。
基本信息:
中图分类号:F249.1;F831
引用信息:
[1]龙腾,李威威,王海军.金融制裁与目标国劳动力市场冲击——基于129个国家数据的经验分析[J].金融经济学研究,2026,41(03):163-174.
基金信息:
广东省哲学社会科学青年项目(GD25YYJ38); 国家社会科学基金一般项目(24BJY090)
2026-03-19
2026-03-19
2026-03-19