| 2,593 | 174 | 24 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
利用2015年中国A股股灾作为自然实验,研究了公司治理与股权质押如何影响上市公司的停牌决策,结果表明,管理层持股比例、机构投资者净持有比例等公司治理特质以及股权质押对公司在股灾中停牌有显著正向影响。股权集中度与公司实施停牌的可能性呈显著负相关关系。利用倾向评分匹配法和双重差分模型进一步研究发现,在股灾中的停牌操纵对公司净复牌收益率呈显著的负面影响,究其原因,主要来自于机构投资者的"惩罚"。
Abstract：By using China's Stock Market Crash in 2015 as the natural experiment data,this paper examines how corporate governance and stock pledge affect corporate trading halt decisions. It finds that corporate governance like management's ownership proportion and institutional investors' net holding and stock pledge all have significant positive impact on the companies' trading halts in stock crash. However,ownership concentration measured by block shareholder' s holding and top 5 shareholders' holding has negative impact. Furthermore,by adopting the PSM method and DID model,this study finds that such trading halts during the stock market crash have negative impact on the net resumption yield,which is mainly caused by institutional investors' punishment.
[1]李姗姗.中国上市公司股票停、复牌制度研究[J].上海经济研究,2016(6).
[2]H.C.Xu,W.Zhang,and Y.F.Liu,2014.Short-term Market Reaction after Trading Halts in Chinese Stock market,Physica A Statistical Mechanics&Its Applications Vol.401,No.5:103-111.
[3]H.K.Yong,J.Yagüe,and J.J.Yang,2010,Relative Performance of Trading Halts and Price Limits:Evidence from the Spanish Stock Exchange.International Review of Economics&Finance Vol.17,No.2:197-215.
[4]Shleifer A.,and R.Vishny,1997.A Survey of Corporate Governance.The Journal of Finance,Vol.52,No.2:737-783.
[5]J.Caskey,and V.Laux,2013.Corporate Governance,Accounting Conservatism,and Manipulation.Management Science.
[6]刘立国,杜莹.公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,2003(2).
[7]Newell R.,and Wilson G.,2002.A Premium for Good Governance.(Corporate Governance).The Mc Kinsey Quarterly,Vol.3:20-23.
[8]Larcker,David F.,and Brian Tayan,2010.Pledge Allegiance to the Company.Corporate Governance Research Program Closer Look Series 11,Stanford University.
[9]Renwick,Scott,2006.Comments on Proposed Rule:Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure.http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/s70306-740.
[10]SEC,2006.Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure;Final Rule and Proposed Rule,71 FR53158,www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.
[11]FSA,2009.Disclosure and Model Code Obligations in Respect of the Use of Shareholdings as Security,http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/UKLA/company/disclosure/index.shtml.
[12]SEB,2009.Regulations,Gazette of India Extraordinary Part-III-Section 4,http://www.sebi.gov.in/acts/sast28jan09.
[13]B.J.Bushee,M.E.Carter,and J.Gerakos,2014.Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms.Journal of Management Accounting Research,vol.26,https://ssrn.com/abstract=1070168.
[14]J.A.Mc Cahery,Z.Sautner,and L.T.Starks,2010.Behind the Scenes:The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors.Journal of Finance,Vol.71:2905–2932.
[15]Gillan,S.L.,and L.T.Starks,2000.Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism:The Role of Institutional Investors.Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.57,No.2:275-305.
[16]陈灿.大股东减持与机构投资者交易行为研究[J].金融经济学研究,2016(4).
[17]Chi Yeguang,2015.Private Information in the Chinese Stock Market:Evidence from Mutual Funds and Corporate Insiders,https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820399.
[18]Chen,Yehning and Shingyang Hu,2007.The Controlling Shareholder's Personal Leverage and Firm Performance.Applied Economics,Vol.39,No.8:1059-1075.
[19]谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(5).
[20]廖静池,李平,曾勇.中国股票市场停牌制度实施效果的实证研究[J].管理世界,2009(2).
[21]清华大学国家金融研究院课题组.完善制度设计,提升市场信心——建设长期健康稳定发展的资本市场[J].清华金融评论,2015(12).
[22]Kyle,1985.Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.Econometrica,Vol.53,No.6:1315-1335.
基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:F832.51;F271
引用信息:
[1]孙建飞.公司治理、股权质押与停牌操纵——来自自然实验的证据[J].金融经济学研究,2017,32(02):92-105.
基金信息: