金融经济学研究

以中国A股上市公司2008—2022年数据为样本，实证检验机构投资者持股对企业风险承担的影响及其作用机制。研究表明，机构投资者持股对企业风险承担具有促进作用。机制分析表明，机构投资者持股通过提高企业研发创新、增加资产减值损失计提及加大非效率投资等渠道促进企业风险承担。企业ESG表现对机构投资者持股与企业风险承担关系具有正向调节作用；股权制衡对机构投资持股与企业风险承担关系具有负向调节作用。异质性分析表明，独立型机构投资者对企业风险承担呈现较强的促进效应，非独立型机构投资者则呈现明显的抑制效应；相对于稳定型独立机构投资者而言，交易型独立机构投资者的促进效应更强。此外，机构投资者对企业风险承担的促进作用在非国有、高内控质量与低市场化水平地区的企业中更显著。建议监管部门加强对机构投资者短期投机行为的监管，引导上市公司积极从事研发创新活动，提升上市公司的会计稳健性，促使机构投资者长期持股。

This study empirically examined the impact of institutional shareholdings on corporate risk-taking and explored the underlying mechanisms using data from China's A-share listed companies for the period 2008-2022.The findings indicated that institutional shareholdings significantly promoted companies' risk-taking.Mechanism analysis revealed that institutional shareholdings elevated corporate risk-taking through channels such as increased R&D innovation, higher asset impairment provisions, and increased inefficient investments.Corporate ESG performance positively moderated the relationship between institutional shareholdings and corporate risk-taking, whereas equity checks and balances exerted a negative moderating effect.Heterogeneity analysis showed that independent institutional investors displayed a stronger promoting effect on corporate risk-taking, whereas non-independent institutional investors exerted a clear inhibiting effect.Moreover, the promoting effect was more pronounced among trading-oriented than among stable independent institutional investors.Additionally, the fostering effect of institutional shareholdings on corporate risk-taking was more evident among non-state-owned companies, companies with higher internal control quality, and those located in regions with lower degrees of marketization.This study suggests that regulatory authorities strengthen oversight of the speculative short-term behavior of institutional investors, encourage listed companies to pursue R&D and innovation and enhance their accounting prudence, and incentivize institutional investors to maintain long-term shareholdings.