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竞争对手分析师荐股评级与焦点企业双元创新
基金项目(Foundation): 教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(24YJC790162)
邮箱(Email): nnxu@jiangnan.edu.cn;
DOI:
发布时间: 2026-08-05
出版时间: 2026-08-05
网络发布时间: 2026-08-05
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摘要:

如何通过资本市场信息传导机制激发企业创新活力,是当前理论与实践共同关注的重要议题。基于2010—2023年A股制造业上市公司数据,考察竞争对手分析师荐股评级信息对焦点企业双元创新的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,竞争对手获得更高分析师荐股评级会显著提升焦点企业的开发式与探索式创新水平。机制分析显示,竞争对手分析师荐股信息通过扩大焦点企业内部薪酬差距、缓解融资约束和提升风险承担能力发挥作用。进一步研究发现,该效应在高管具备研发或海外背景以及明星分析师覆盖度较强的企业中更为突出。此外,竞争对手的分析师荐股评级上调还会增强焦点企业投资对股价信号的敏感性,并改善其未来市场绩效。据此,相关部门应强化证券分析师的信息溢出功能,完善资本市场信息传导机制,并引导企业优化高管结构与激励机制,为激发企业双元创新、驱动实体经济高质量发展提供制度保障。

Abstract:

Understanding how capital-market information transmission stimulates corporate innovation is of central importance to both theory and practice.Using a panel of Chinese A-share listed manufacturing firms from 2010 to 2023,this study examines how analyst stock ratings of rivals affect focal firms' ambidextrous innovation and explores the underlying mechanisms.We find that higher analyst ratings assigned to rivals significantly increase both exploitative and exploratory innovation of focal firms.Mechanism analyses show that this effect operates through widening internal pay dispersion,alleviating financing constraints,and enhancing firms' risktaking capacity.Further analyses reveal that the positive effect is more pronounced among firms whose top executives possess R&D or overseas experience,and firms covered by star analysts.In addition,upward revisions in rivals' analyst ratings strengthen focal firms' investment sensitivity to stock price signals and improve their subsequent market performance.Overall,our findings uncover cross-firm information spillovers arising from analyst stock ratings and provide novel evidence on how capital-market information intermediaries promote corporate innovation and high-quality economic development.

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基本信息:

中图分类号:F425;F273.1;F832.51

引用信息:

[1]周方召,刘倩,徐娜娜.竞争对手分析师荐股评级与焦点企业双元创新[J].金融经济学研究().

基金信息:

教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(24YJC790162)

发布时间:

2026-08-05

出版时间:

2026-08-05

网络发布时间:

2026-08-05

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