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基于2008—2022年中国A股上市公司数据，研究管理者声誉对企业金融化的影响。研究表明，良好的管理者声誉对企业金融化具有显著的抑制效应，该结论经稳健性检验后依然成立。机制分析发现，声誉良好的管理者具备更强的印象管理动机和自我实现动机，采取更为稳健的经营策略，从而抑制企业金融化；细分企业金融资产类型发现，管理者声誉对企业长期性金融化形成抑制作用，而对短期性金融化没有影响。异质性分析表明，在货币政策宽松期以及投资者保护水平较弱和管理者控制权较强的企业中，管理者声誉与企业金融化的负向关系更为显著。拓展分析表明，管理者声誉对企业金融化的抑制作用能够促进企业创新。因此，应重视建立健全声誉治理机制，完善监管制度建设与企业内部治理，进一步强化长期价值创造的目标导向，提高企业防范金融风险的能力。
Abstract：This study used data from China's A-share listed companies for the period 2008-2022 to investigate the influence of managerial reputation on corporate financialization.The findings indicated that a favorable managerial reputation had a significant suppressing effect on corporate financialization, and this conclusion remained robust after a series of robustness tests.Furthermore, mechanism analysis revealed that managers with strong reputations possessed stronger motivations for impression management and self-realization.These led them to adopt more prudent operational strategies, which, in turn, curbed corporate financialization.Moreover, when different types of corporate financial assets were examined, a strong managerial reputation was found to inhibit long-term financialization.However, it did not affect short-term financialization.Additionally, heterogeneity analysis showed that the negative relationship between managerial reputation and corporate financialization was more pronounced during times of loose monetary policy and among companies with weaker investor protection and stronger managerial control rights.An extended analysis demonstrated that the restraining effect of managerial reputation on corporate financialization could promote corporate innovation.Therefore, this study recommends enhancing reputation governance mechanisms, improving regulatory systems and internal corporate governance, strengthening long-term value creation, and elevating the capacity of companies to mitigate financial risks.
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(1)限于篇幅,省略检验结果,留存备索。
基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:F272.91;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]马连福,袁琛.管理者声誉能够抑制企业“脱实向虚”吗[J].金融经济学研究,2025,40(03):105-123.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目(72172063);国家自然科学基金项目(71772094)